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When I first started teaching Constitutional Law, Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky offered me his syllabus and notes. Anyone who has
taught Constitutional Law understands what a gift this was! Indeed,
without Professor Chemerinsky's help, I doubt I would have survived
my initial encounter with the course; the volume alone is enough to
swamp the first time teacher of Constitutional Law. Professor
Chemerinsky's syllabus was premised upon the use of the Stone,
Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet, Constitutional Law textbook1
(hereinafter Stone), and I adopted it because of my faith in Professor
Chemerinsky's judgment. Despite the book's limitations, I have found
the Stone text to be the one most suited to the needs of my course.
Several years have gone by since I first taught Constitutional Law.
The course has changed from six hours over two semesters to four
hours in one semester. The shorter course has resulted in less
coverage: we study separation of powers, federalism, due process, and
equal protection. First Amendment issues are taught in a separate
course. Still, I continue to use the Stone textbook.
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Professors teaching Constitutional Law have many excellent
textbook choices, and I rely on a number of texts in my class preparations and research. I am attached to the Stone textbook as a primary
book because it coincides with my teaching needs, as I will explain.
I should also add that my research interests in equal protection lead me
to follow Professors Sunstein's and Tushnet's work quite closely, and
my respect for their scholarship bears heavily on my commitment to
their textbook.
My primary goal in teaching first year Constitutional Law is to
inspire students to think creatively about the role of constitutional law
in law.2 With this as my goal, I think it is more important to explore
in-depth select basic concepts rather than explore many concepts with
little depth. Consequently, students read about 500 pages in the
course, which is only 1/4-1/5 of what the Stone textbook offers.
With all these disclosures, then, let me highlight three qualities of
the book that keep me committed to it. I will also touch on some areas
where the book disappoints me. Even in those areas, however, it is my
experience that most other textbooks also fall short of my needs.
The primary reasons I use the Stone textbook are its inclusiveness,
its scholarly emphasis, and its commitment to exploring different
schools of legal analysis. These are related qualities of the book and
I will illustrate my thoughts by focusing on my favorite topic: race
and equal protection.
The authors devote about 200 pages to this important topic. In
fact, the first 100 pages of their coverage explore the history of race
discrimination in the United States, laying an important foundation for
modern equal protection analysis, beginning with Korematsu v. United
States.3 In my opinion, it is essential to expose students to this
history because many of them are unfamiliar with it except in the most
general sense. Inclusion of this history also affirms its importance and
relevance to modern equal protection analysis. Currently, there is a
national movement toward "color blindness," which may stem from a
belief by many Americans that racism is no longer a problem. An
examination of the history helps dispel this notion, at least with many
students who are studying it in-depth for the first time. Some white
students have remarked that they are surprised that anyone could think

2. I wish I had a bumper sticker that read, "CON. LAW IS LAW," to tell how important
I think constitutional law is.
3. 323 U.S. 214 (1944), reprinted in STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 597 (upholding an
Executive Order that required the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II).
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that our society has overcome this profound history of discrimination
in such a short time.
Given the history of race discrimination, most students agree that
laws that discriminate on the basis of race should be subject to
heightened scrutiny. Students willingly engage in discussions on the
appropriateness of this, particularly on the question of whether it is the
role of the Court to create different levels of equal protection review.
They are also extremely interested in understanding how heightened
scrutiny works, beginning with perhaps the most difficult question:
How do you know whether a law racially discriminates? The textbook
does an excellent job organizing and synthesizing the cases addressed
to this question. Specifically, the authors distinguish four general types
of race discrimination cases: race classifications that explicitly hurt
minorities, classifications not based on race but that hurt minorities,
classifications that are facially race-neutral but hurt minorities, and race
classifications intended to help minorities.4
The categorization of the cases is immensely helpful to students
because it is often not clear how race discrimination evidences itself in
seemingly race-neutral laws. In addition, the authors also provide
extensive case comments from scholars of different schools of legal
thought. For example, in the note section focusing on nonrace-specific
classifications, the authors include comments and insights on the cases
from a variety of traditional and nontraditional scholars, including
critical race theorists.S Inclusion of critical race theorists' perspectives
in this section is especially helpful in illuminating the unconscious
racism lurking in the cases. Moreover, this juxtaposition of cases and
theory is effective in provoking students to genuinely explore their
thoughts and feelings about race discrimination in their own lives.
Without the critical race perspective, in my opinion, it is all too easy
to fail to grapple with the profundity of racism and with the reality
that the precept of white superiority is built into traditional legal
analysis. Unmasking racism is instrumental to an exploration of the
role equal protection analysis plays or should play in promoting race
equality.
I find the authors' references to the most recent prominent
scholarly work in constitutional law invaluable. Not only do I feel upto-date as I go into my classes, but I also find the book valuable in my
research. The authors' annual supplement is like a summary of the
Index to Legal Periodicals; all the cutting-edge references are there.

4.
5.

STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 595-684.
Id. at 610-35.
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Although I am attached to the book, it does not do an adequate
job, in my opinion, in the benign race discrimination cases. For
example, I think the authors made a mistake when they relegated the
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke6 case to a short case
note 7 and highlighted Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.8 and Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena9 as the affirmative action cases.' 0 In my
opinion, Bakke should be covered in much greater detail for a number
of reasons. First, Bakke begins the unraveling of affirmative action.
Today, the affirmative action debate is our nation's racial scapegoat
and I believe it is important for students to study the beginning of its
demise. Second, and closely related, Justice Powell's opinion is
instrumental to understanding the relationship between affirmative
action and diversity. In his opinion, Justice Powell suggested that it
is constitutional for a state school to diversify its student body so long
as the school did not make admissions decisions based on race.1' The
diversity rhetoric has essentially eviscerated the concept of affirmative
action, as evidenced by the Court's opinion in United States v. Virginia
(VMI).' 2 Note that Justice Ginsberg's majority opinion in that case
suggests that an all -male state university might be constitutional if only
it were truly created for the purpose of creating diversity.'3 Again,
an effective critique of this position necessitates a grounding in the
origins of the diversity rationale. How can students critically analyze
cases like VMI without an in-depth exploration of Bakke?
Moreover, Bakke is essential study material if students are to
understand the relationship among the concepts of diversity, affirmative action, integration, and equality. In other words, when Justice
Powell sanctioned the use of diversity in state school admissions
programs but denounced affirmative action policies themselves, 14 he
left a mixed message about the role of equal protection in promoting
racial equality. He suggested diversity is intrinsically valuable in a
public school, but that it is not the responsibility of the state to ensure
public schools actually have diverse student populations.' This is a
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11.
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1997).
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15.

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 648-49.
488 U.S. 469 (1989), reprinted in STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 652.
515 U.S. 200 (1995), reprinted in STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 672.
STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 648-97.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90, 319-20.
116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996), reprinted in STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 82 (3d ed. Supp.

Id. at 2273, 2277.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-320.
See id.
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good place to reintroduce Brown v. Board of Education,6 which
obligates the state to racially diversify its public schools in the context
of desegregating them. 7 I ask my students: "How was U.C. Davis
Medical School supposed to desegregate without affirmative action
programs?" This analysis, premised on a full rendition of Bakke, leads
to further discussions about the differences, if any, between de jure and
de facto segregation in the quest for racial equality. This is brought
full-circle, of course, in Missouri v. Jenkins. 8
Fourth, this whole discussion beginning with Bakke brings
together all the prior lessons about unconscious racism. Bakke is a fine
example of how unconscious racism works. How did a white man who
got rejected from ten medical schools two years in a row (let's say he
didn't qualify for 2,000 seats) lay claim to one of those sixteen spots
at Davis? Why was reserving, in effect, eighty-four seats for whites
not sufficient for him? Why did the Court accept the unstated
assumption behind his claim that, in fact, all 100 seats should be
reserved for whites, like they always had been? The more facts
students have on Bakke, the more critical their analysis is likely to be
on the case.
Finally, I think it is important to include Bakke as a case (rather
than a case note) because it focuses on affirmative action in public
education. 9 I think the Court might be persuaded of the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in public education even if it
chooses to reject such programs in public employment. The argument
might begin from this premise: If public schools were racially equal
and provided equal educations to all children, then perhaps there
would be less need to employ affirmative action when the graduates of
racially equal schools compete with one another in public employment.
Significantly, educational equality eliminates questions about applicants' qualifications, which are always lurking in the affirmative action
debate. Indeed, Allan Bakke's claim rested on the assertion that he
was more qualified than minority candidates who got accepted with
lower test scores. 2" One way around the debate about exam biases is

16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 523.
17. Id. See also Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955), reprinted
in STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 530 (demanding desegregation "with all deliberate speed").
18. 515 U.S. 70 (1995), cited in STONE ET AL., supra note 1, at 550-51 (holding equal per
pupil expenditures constitutional for white and black students in de facto segregated public
schools).
19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269 (presenting a challenge to a public medical school's admissions
policies).
20. Id. at 277.
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to ensure educational equality for all children. More importantly,
when children grow up in integrated schools where they share equal
status across the board, where their racial identities are respected, and
where they enjoy equal success, then they will have a deeper appreciation of each other in the adult market world. Racial inequality would
be foreign and repulsive to them. At least, this would be the hope in
what appears now to be a rather hopeless backlash against affirmative
action. Bakke needs to remain in the book because it is at odds with
Brown and there are critical comparisons to be made between them.
I have focused on the authors' exploration of race to illustrate why
I use the book and why I find it valuable. These outstanding qualities
of the book are not limited to race, however. The authors provide
excellent material on just about every possible area of discrimination
law, as well as on the basics of separation of powers, federalism, and
first amendment issues.
Inevitably, any textbook will be of limited use to a professor who
has had time to reflect on the area of the law, and who has perhaps
written in the field because the professor's personality will shape how
the book is used. I like the Stone textbook because it is so thorough
that I can use it to cover almost anything touching on constitutional
law from the basic course to my Fourteenth Amendment class to my
Outsider Jurisprudence Seminar (where it supplements a reader). I
rely on it to present thought-provoking questions and to provide up-todate case coverage and scholarly articles.

